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OIS Registry

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21 FEB 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:

Director of Information Services

SUBJECT: Collateral Top Secret Control Program

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1. As part of our continuing review of OIS programs, we recently examined our responsibility for the Collateral Top Secret Control Program. I did not like what we found, and I believe it imperative to bring to your attention a very serious problem that exists in Top Secret control. In the following paragraphs I will describe the recent background of the Program, the nature and scope of the problem, and what we are doing about it. In paragraph 5 I also am requesting your help.

2. As you may recall, the Collateral Top Secret Control Program was transferred from OS to OIS in June 1981. At that time there was a very large processing backlog associated with the Program. This backlog was eliminated by August 1982 and for this the responsible OIS section, now known as the Information Control Section (ICS), received the Meritorious Unit Citation.

3. With the processing backlog gone, ICS was able, for the first time, to oversee and conduct collateral Top Secret inventories and audits based on current information. These inventories and audits were conducted in every Agency component throughout 1983 and the resulting statistics, I am sure you will agree, are appalling. Of the approximately 85,000 collateral Top Secret documents listed as being held in the Agency, as many as 12,000 were found to be unaccounted for. The reasons for this large a number include several possibilities involving human and administrative error. The worst possibility, of course, is that some may have been intentionally removed from Agency premises.

4. There are three basic deficiencies associated with the Program and we are in the process of correcting two. The first has been known for some time and concerns the automated system used to support the Program. It is a very labor-intensive and outdated system that both OS and OIS tried to have updated or replaced over the years. It is now scheduled to be replaced in August 1985 as part of our development of TRIS. The second we have been

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looking at since I took this position and concerns the organizational structure in which the Program was placed. Since its transfer to OIS, the Program has been located in the component responsible for automated systems maintenance and development and, as a consequence, it has largely been overshadowed by our considerable efforts in these areas. To rectify this and to place it with other security and audit-related programs that have characteristics in common, the Program will be organizationally moved within the next few weeks.

5. The remaining deficiency concerns the number of personnel we can dedicate to the Program. Currently we have only one professional and two clericals full time. One other person, a paraprofessional, devotes approximately half of his time to the Program and the other half to various types of systems maintenance. For adequate staffing, the Program should have at least three additional positions. With this increase in staffing, we would be able to resolve the questions concerning the 12,000 "missing" documents, upgrade and otherwise prepare the data base for conversion in 1985, and establish, for the first time, a viable Top Secret document control program. OIS does not now have the ceiling to accomplish this, and it is for this reason I now need your help. I recognize that you may not have three positions to give and that you may not even be able to authorize OIS to be over strength by three, but something must be done and soon. One alternative is to ask the other Deputy Directors to help, i.e., reduce their own strength by one so OIS can be over strength by three in the same way that staff is provided to the Office of Personnel's out-placement service. Such assistance can be temporary in the hope that we can get the positions as part of the initiatives in the OIS 1986 program.

6. I do not think I need to point out what the consequences could be if this situation is allowed to continue indefinitely. If our knowledge of thousands of unaccounted for documents became known to the public, the embarrassment to the Agency would be considerable; our position is truly indefensible. However, the biggest concern is security, the security of information that, by definition, could cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. It seems to us that if the Agency can devote the necessary resources to account for such things as each dollar of the budget, each piece of equipment, and each parking space, we should give at least equal consideration to documents that, also by definition, concern our most sensitive human sources and methods information.

7. Because of the serious nature of this situation, the above will be included as a topic at the next Quarterly Review.

DA/OIS/RMD/ITB/ [] (10 February 1984)

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